25 September 2024: Towards a WTO-compatible Export Support Mechanism: Implications for Bangladesh
About the presentation:
Presented by: Mr Md Hossain Uzzaman, Research Associate
Moderated by: Dr M A Razzaque, Chairman
This presentation highlights the impact of Bangladesh's upcoming graduation from LDC status in 2026, which will result in the loss of vital international support measures, including duty-free and quota-free access, as well as special treatments provided under WTO rules. This poses challenges for Bangladesh, particularly in maintaining export competitiveness. The country currently provides export support through various mechanisms, including cash incentives, duty drawbacks, and bonded warehouse facilities, which have contributed to the growth of its Ready-Made Garments (RMG) sector. Post-graduation, Bangladesh must align its policies with WTO rules, requiring a review of its export support mechanisms. The presentation made the audiences aware of Bangladesh's current export support measures and their WTO compatibility, global experiences in supporting exporter and industries, and policy recommendations for WTO compliance.
Md. Hossain Uzzaman
PPT slides
here.
Highlights from the Q&A session:
Question: Did the researchers find any examples of how already graduated LDCs support their exporters?
Response:
Bangladesh holds a unique position among graduating LDCs, as no other graduated LDC has experienced export-led economic growth on the same scale. Consequently, the researchers could not identify any such examples, as almost all graduated LDCs are smaller economies with less emphasis on export.
Question: If Bangladesh were included in Annex VII (b) of LDCs, would it be possible for Bangladesh to be competitive with all kinds of products it exports?
Response:
Even if Bangladesh were included in Annex VII (b), it would not be able to provide export supports for its major export items, as 28 Bangladeshi export items (in jute and RMG) have already reached the export competitiveness threshold. However, Bangladesh could provide support for other products that have the potential to be export competitive but have not achieved that status due to various reasons.
Question: In the examples of how other countries support exporters, there were instances that appeared to be WTO-compatible. How can some countries continue providing support even though it seems that such support is not WTO-compatible?
Response:
While some export support measures may appear to violate the WTO’s ASCM, not all these measures are necessarily challenged at the WTO's DSB. There are several reasons for this. Countries often weigh various factors before deciding to pursue a case. They may choose not to challenge certain subsidies for diplomatic reasons or to maintain positive trade relations. A country is more likely to initiate a dispute only when subsidies cause substantial harm to its domestic industries or international trade interests. If the impact of a subsidy is minimal, the potential benefits of challenging it may not justify the effort. Moreover, WTO disputes can be costly and time-consuming. Smaller or developing countries may lack the financial resources or legal expertise to pursue a case, even if they have legitimate grounds to do so. In many instances, countries prefer to resolve trade disputes through bilateral negotiations rather than resorting to the formal DSB process.
Question: Can the researchers provide any insight into whether and how much success the recommended policies would bring for exporters? Which recommendations are expected to be the most successful for exporters?
Response:
Estimating the extent of success the recommendations would bring was beyond the capacity of the current study.
Question: As supports like cash subsidies will need to be stopped after 2029, is the government currently reducing these supports?
Response:
Yes, the government has been gradually reducing cash incentives over the past year to ensure compatibility with WTO regulations. However, another approach could be to make the most of the remaining time before 2029 by effectively utilising the policy space to strengthen the foundation of certain industries.
Comments and feedback:
• Given the context that there already exists an anti-export bias in Bangladesh due to high tariff rates protecting domestic import-competing industries, government support aimed at making these industries export-competitive may further worsen the existing anti-export bias.
• The simplification of the Duty Drawback Scheme, as mentioned in Bangladesh's National Tariff Policy (NTP), can be considered.
• Since there is still room to support exporters in WTO-incompatible ways until 2029, considering due restraint period, Bangladesh can use this time to strengthen the industrial base in key sectors to cushion the post-graduation shock from the loss of some export supports. For example, the country could shift export support from cotton-based apparel to man-made fibre (MMF)-based apparel, aligning with the changing preferences of RMG buyers. Similarly, support can be extended to the leather industry to make it environmentally sustainable, making effective use of the remaining period.
Export support for agricultural goods can be provided for a longer period even after graduation through the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) or by remaining on the list of Net Food-Importing Developing Countries (NFIDC). Therefore, it would not be wise to lift existing supports now. Instead, they should be continued until Bangladesh's AMS threshold crosses the de minimis level or it exits the NFIDC list.
• The presentation recommended introducing regional support programmes to incentivize the decentralisation of industrial investment in Bangladesh. However, there is already a provision in place that encourages investment in disadvantaged regions.